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Non-technical summary
We compare the results of a tax reform analysis obtained with the col-
lective model of household labour supply and consumption behaviour with
results obtained with the unitary model, in which the household is assumed
to maximise a single utility function, even if it consists of several individuals.
The theoretical implications of this simplifying assumption turn out to be
rather restrictive and are most often rejected when tested. The collective
approach to household behaviour can be seen as a substantial improvement
over the unitary model as it explicitly accounts for the existence of several
decision makers. The main assumption is that the intrahousehold bargain-
ing process results in Pareto efficient outcomes. Depending on the choice of
the representation of household behaviour one may expect welfare analysis
of policy reforms to yield different results. Here we focus on the quanti-
tative discrepancies entailed by the use of a unitary model when assessing
the labour supply response to a tax reform and the subsequent impacts on
individual welfare.
The first objective is the calibration of a collective model of household
labour supply. The approach focuses on the direct modelling of the house-
hold’s position on the Pareto frontier, which determines the labour supply
and consumption of household members. This allows to account for the
distinction between participation and hours of work, for non-linear and non-
convex budget sets, and for non-egoistic individual preferences. The question
addressed by our second objective is: ‘how large are the distortions arising
from the use of a unitary model in the assessment of a tax reform, when
household behaviour follows the collective model?’ To do so, we simulate
data by a compound procedure of estimation and calibration based on the
1998 wave of the German socio-economic panel. A unitary model is then
estimated on this ‘collective data’. Investigating the effects of a move from
joint to individual taxation, we obtain important discrepancies between pre-
dicted adjustments to labour supply, and distortions in the welfare analysis
of the reform on the basis of unitary estimates. Apart from possible misspec-
ification of the unitary model, discrepancies between the predictions from
both representations can only be due to the wrong assumption that (collec-
tive) households behave as if they were single decision makers. Our results
hence suggest that increased efforts should be devoted to the estimation of
collective models with taxation.
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Abstract
This paper compares predictions obtained for the analysis of tax
reforms with collective and unitary models of household labour sup-
ply and consumption behaviour. We simulate real world microdata by
means of a collective approach, using a compound procedure of esti-
mation and calibration based on the 1998 wave of the German socio-
economic panel. We estimate a unitary model on this ‘collective’ data
set. Investigating a move from joint to individual taxation on the basis
of both models, we obtain important discrepancies between predicted
adjustments to labour supply and distortions in the welfare analysis
of the reform on the basis of unitary estimates. These results suggest
that increased efforts should be devoted to the estimation of collective
models with taxation.
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1 Introduction
Reforms of the tax and social benefit system generally have an impact on
individuals’ and families’ living conditions and on their behaviour with re-
gard to labour supply and consumption. Moreover, such reforms may affect
the intra-household distribution of resources in ways that differ from the in-
tentions behind them. In this paper we analyse the impact a particular tax
reform would (possibly) have in Germany, on households’ consumption be-
haviour, on the labour supply of women and men, and on the within-family
distribution of wealth.
In investigating these questions, an appealing representation of the deci-
sion process of the household is the collective framework, introduced by Chi-
appori (1988, 1992), and Apps and Rees (1988). This type of model accounts
for the presence of multiple decision makers within the household, in contrast
to the traditional, or unitary, representation. Unitary models consider house-
hold behaviour as resulting from the decisions of a single unit, obscuring the
fact that households are most of the time composed of several members. They
treat the family as a ‘black box’, and thus the within-family reallocation of
resources resulting from a policy reform cannot be reconstructed. It is as-
sumed that the household maximises a unique utility function, independent
of prices and incomes. With the unitary models, only inter-household income
inequality can be studied. Yet the question of intra-family redistribution can
be crucial in determining household choices. These issues are important if
policy makers want to conduct efficient and fair economic and social policies.
Drawing on the collective framework, on the contrary, opens up the pos-
sibility to infer aspects of the within-household welfare implications of policy
changes. Collective models basically assume only Pareto-optimality of intra-
household allocations, and this assumption defines the collective rationality of
households. Chiappori (1988) distinguishes two cases, according to whether
agent’s preferences are egoistic or altruistic. If the agents have egoistic pref-
erences and face a linear budget constraint or a convex budget set (Donni,
2003 and Beninger, 2000), their behaviour can be represented sequentially,
using an explicit income sharing rule. Otherwise, a sequential representation
of household behaviour is no longer possible, but this behaviour still results
from the sharing of consumption between agents (Chiappori, 1988).
A main contribution of this study will be a concrete comparison of the
implications of the choice between the two representations mentioned above.
The question is whether the predictions of labour supply responses to a tax
reform and the changes of the distribution of welfare vary substantially with
the representation chosen. Our goal is to quantify the distortions that may
affect policy recommendations obtained with the unitary representation.
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In order to compare the two settings, we cannot rely on an estimation
strategy, in contrast to Moreau and Donni (2002), as the full estimation of
a collective model with nonconvex budget sets and a participation decision
for both spouses is a difficult task which has not yet been achieved. To
circumvent this problem, we simulate real world microdata by means of a
‘deterministic’ collective labour supply model. A unitary model is then es-
timated on this ‘collective’ data set where households behave according to
the collective rationality. The evaluation of a tax reform based on these two
models allows to compare the performance of the collective and the unitary
model of family behaviour.1
Previous work by Beninger and Laisney (2002) addressed these issues on
the basis of purely synthetic data. Their study reveals important discrepan-
cies (1) in the incentive and distribution effects of revenue-neutral reforms
based on unitary estimates rather than on the true collective parameters,
(2) in predicted adjustments of labour supplies following a switch between
two tax regimes (individual and joint taxation for couples), and (3), it also
provides evidence of conflicting results when welfare analyses of policy re-
forms are based on unitary estimates rather than collective estimates. The
aim of the present paper is to check the robustness of these results when
the ‘collective baseline situation’ does not result from synthetically simu-
lated households but rather is generated by a model based on reasonable
assumptions, giving results close to reality, thanks to the use of calibration.
2 Brief outline
Our real world collective data are calibrated so as to reflect the characteris-
tics (labour supply, household income/consumption level) of couples of the
1998 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) in a realistic way.
Our strategy relies on the assumption that some aspects of individual pref-
erences — but not all — concerning own consumption and leisure are the same
for single and married women or men. To take up possible utility-producing
complementarity effects of leisure, a term accounting for interaction between
spouses’ leisures, namely a ‘cross-leisure effect’ is also considered. Under
these assumptions we estimate individual preference parameters for singles
and use these estimates to simulate collective couple data simply by exploit-
1Here, in order to save space, we focus on a single reform, namely a revenue neutral
move from joint to individual taxation. Further evidence for Germany concerning a revenue
neutral move to a linear tax system, and the ‘reform 2000’, as well as results for other
European countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the UK) can be found in Laisney
(2002, ed.).
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ing the Pareto-optimality assumption for the households’ decision process;
this allows us to retrieve both the cross-leisure effect and a power index for
each couple, by calibration on GSOEP couple data. We then regress this cal-
ibrated power index on a set of variables, including some original variables
describing the way in which the tax and benefit system affects the relative
net earning potential of the spouse. We subsequently predict the power index
for different tax situations and thereby simulate the effects of a tax reform
on spouses’ consumption levels and labour supplies. The reform studied here
consists in a revenue neutral switch from joint to individual taxation.
In a further step, the baseline simulated data are used to estimate a uni-
tary model for consumption and household labour supply. This allows us to
compare the results of policy evaluations obtained with both types of models
on a number of dimensions, including both positive (impact on behaviour)
and normative aspects (impact on individual welfare and on household wel-
fare, and impact on inequality measures). Thus, we could analyse the impacts
of a given tax reform on both efficiency (incentive effects on joint decisions
of individual labour) and equity (distributional and welfare impacts on both
an individual and household basis). The question we address here is: how
large are the errors committed when basing policy recommendations on es-
timations from the unitary model when the collective model is the true one?
If these distortions turn out to be large, more effort should be put into the
estimation of collective models in complex settings, including non-convex
budgets and possible non-participation for both spouses.
The outline of the paper is the following. In Section 3 we describe the
simplified version of the 1998 German tax-benefit system that will be used
in the sequel. Section 4 introduces the characteristics of the samples from
the GSOEP data used to construct our collective data set; this includes
the description of the samples of single men and women that will be used
not only for calibration of the preferences of couples but also for designing
revenue neutral reforms, and more generally for the analysis of the reforms
(the reader may first skip Sections 3 and 4, referring back to them when
required by the context). Section 5 presents the steps used in the calibration
procedure. These include the estimation of preference parameters for singles,
the calibration of leisure interaction coefficients, one for each spouse, and of
a power index. The latter turns out to be related to variables reflecting the
impact of the tax system on the relative net earnings capacity of husband
and wife; through that channel, reforms of the tax-benefit system will affect
the bargaining power of the spouses. In Section 6 we describe the reform
considered, and analyse it on the basis of the collective model. The estimation
and simulation results for the unitary model are presented in Section 7, where
we also compare the simulated effects of the tax reform in the collective world
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with those predicted by the unitary model. Section 8 concludes.
Figure A.1, placed on the last page for easy reference, gives a road map
through the paper, visualising the links between the subsections.
3 The 1998 German tax-benefit system
Germany has a personal income tax system administered at the federal level
and regulated by the Personal Income Law (Einkommensteuergesetz). The
German tax system is characterized by a comprehensive tax that covers
labour earnings as well as income from other sources such as capital in-
vestment, housing rents etc. and by joint taxation for married couples. For
our exercise we use a simplified form of the 1998 German tax and benefit
system described in detail in Table 1.2 Gross income is the sum of income
from different sources: income from employment, capital investment, rental
and leasing and maintenance payments received from an ex-partner. Gross
taxable income is equal to gross income minus income-related expenses. The
standard deductions are listed in Table 1.
The function applied to the tax base is smoothly progressive. In 1998
the top rate applied was 53% for yearly earnings in excess of DM 120,041.3
Earnings below the basic personal allowance of DM 12,365 are tax free. The
tax schedule used is the same for singles and for couples. However, the
‘Ehegattensplitting’ method (marital splitting) is used for couples: the tax
rate is applied to half of the joint taxable income, and the outcome is doubled
in order to obtain the total income tax liability of the spouses. Tax rate
progressivity and marital splitting lead to a relative advantage for married
couples if spouses have unequal incomes.
Parents can opt for either a child benefit (DM 220 for the first and the
second child, DM 300 for the third and DM 350 from the fourth child on) or
a child allowance, that is a lump-sum deduction of DM 6,912 for each child
up to age 27, if still in education or doing military or civil service. Due to
the progressive tax scheme the child benefit is less, and the tax deduction is
more, favourable for high-income households.
Social benefits are means-tested and depend on the number of people in
the household.4 As a simplification, we assume that the maximum social
2This simplification is an adaptation, to our particular sample and emphasis, of the
microsimulation program developed at ZEW (for a description see Jacobebbinghaus and
Steiner, 2003).
3For convenience, the tax rules, and also our tax program, are written in DM rather
than in euro, as the non-linear 1998 German tax scheme is only available in DM (1 euro
= 1.95583 DM). All other nominal magnitudes in the paper will be given in euro.
4In our static setting we ignore unemployment insurance and unemployment benefits
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benefit (including housing benefit and special payments) a person can re-
ceive is DM 1,000 a month and DM 700 for the partner.5 In addition there
are age-dependent supplementary payments for children. The amount of the
transfer depends on the level of earned income (‘anrechnungsfreies Erwerb-
seinkommen’) and is degressive, depending on the relevant income measure.
In addition, social benefits are related to the geographical location, since
they are paid by the local governments and housing benefits depend on the
average rent of the locality. We distinguish only between East and West
Germany, and approximate that social benefits are 10% lower in the East.
The difference between East and West Germany stems from the lower costs
of living in the East: a substantial fraction of the social benefit is the housing
benefit. Finally, social benefit payments depend on the wealth situation of
the household, and child benefits are deducted from social benefit payments.
As a graphical illustration of the tax-benefit system described above, Fig-
ure 1 depicts a typical situation for a couple with two children. The husband
has an hourly wage rate of 25 euro, the wife earns 18 euro per hour. The
household does not have any capital inflows or income from rental or leasing.
It is therefore eligible for means-tested social benefits at low labour income.
The parents receive child benefit for both children. From a yearly gross in-
come of just above 80,000 euro they will opt for child allowance instead, as
the tax relief exceeds the lump-sum benefit payment. Figure 1 also reveals
the non-convexity of the resulting budget constraint when labour earnings
are high enough for social benefit payments to cease.
4 Data
We use the 1998 wave from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP),
a representative panel data sample of households and individuals living in
Germany. The GSOEP started in 1984 with annual interviews in the Federal
Republic of Germany and was extended to the former Germany Democratic
Republic from 1990 on. The panel gives a wealth of information on the labour
market status of individuals and on the various income sources of families.
We selected German nationals aged between 25 and 55 years. All are
employees with a contractual labour supply of at least 10 hours per week or
individuals who are voluntarily out of employment. The restriction on hours
which are both related to former earnings. Both transfers actually require the search of,
and the willingness to take up, a job.
5The maximum social allowances we apply for both parts of Germany are based on
the average effective maximum social benefits paid in 1998 (see Statistisches Bundesamt,
2001).
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Table 1: Simplified tax-benefit system for household taxation, Germany 1998
singles (married couples)
Taxable income
earnings
capital income
income from rental and leasing
maintenance payments from ex-partner
Tax reliefs
DM 2,000 (4,000) standard deduction for earnings(a)
DM 6,000 (12,000) standard deduction for capital income
DM 108 (216) standard special expense deduction
child allowance (or child benefit alternatively)
exemption for social security contribution (‘Vorsorge’)
maintenance payments to ex-partner
Tax base: Taxable income - Tax reliefs
Tax schedule: Tax rate applied to (half) the tax base:
Income (X) bracket Income tax liability
0-12,365 0
12,366-58,643 (91.19·Y+2,590)·Y
58,644-120,041 (151.96·Z+3,343)·Z+13,938
>120,041 0.53·X-22,843
X=rounded taxable income, Y=(X-12,312)/10,000, Z=(X-58,590/10,000)
solidarity supplement: tax scaled up by a factor of 1.055 (b)
Net Income: gross income - (twice) the tax liability
Benefits
child benefit: DM 220 for 1st and 2nd child, DM 300 for 3rd,
DM 350 from 4th child on (or child allowance alternatively)
means tested social benefits (incl. housing benefit and special payments):(c)
DM 1,000 in the West, DM 900 in the East.(d)
means tested social benefits for partner and children, depending on age
Maintenance
maintenance payments to children, ex-partners
or parents outside the household
Disposable income: net income + benefits - maintenance(e)
Notes: (a) The tax scheme is given in DM because of the non-linearity of the tax
function. Since 2000, the tax scheme is given in DM and euro by the Federal Govern-
ment. 1 euro = 1.95583 DM. Time unit is the year. (b) The solidarity supplement
for the reconstruction of East Germany (‘Solidaritätszuschlag’) is based on a measure
of taxable income that includes the child allowance whether or not parents opt for
it. (c) For lack of information on the stock of savings etc., we assume that couples
reporting more than DM 600 capital income or more than DM 4,800 rental income
per year are not eligible for social benefit payments. (d) These numbers are based
on the average effective maximum social benefit paid in 1998 Statistisches Bundesamt
(2001). (e) Social security contributions, although largely compulsory, are taken as
consumption expenditures and are not deducted from disposable income. Admittedly,
the different types of social security contributions paid in Germany have different con-
sumptive aspects, and our assumption is probably more appropriate for payments to
the pension system than for health insurance contributions.
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Figure 1: The 1998 German tax-benefit system.
The figure illustrates the situation of a couple with two children. The wife and
the husband earn 18 and 25 euro per hour, respectively. At low levels of labour
income they are eligible to means-tested social benefit.
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is introduced to avoid the occurrence of extraordinarily high wage rates as the
ratio of earnings over hours for people with less than 10 hours. We excluded
the self-employed from the sample, as well as individuals in parental leave or
in education or registered as unemployed.
The sample of singles consists of 488 individuals: 208 women and 280
men. A ‘single’ is defined as an individual with the above characteristics
and living alone. He or she may have dependent children living outside the
household. We also selected 1332 families composed of a married couple
and, possibly, dependent children.6 As for singles, dependent children may
live outside the household.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for single and married women and
men, respectively. The regional indicator East Germany should capture so-
cial, educational, economic and cultural differences between both parts of
the country, at least partially. Given our selection, single women from East-
ern Germany are under-represented in the sample (approximately 20% of the
population live in the East, which is correctly reflected for men). In general
singles are characterised by a younger age, higher schooling level, more uni-
versity graduates and a remarkably higher participation rate, particularly
among women. Single men have on average a higher level of vocational ed-
ucation than women: while 13% of the women have no vocational training,
the corresponding figure for men is only 6%. This concerns essentially West
Germans, but the proportion of people with polytechnic or university degree
is lower in the East. Wives have on average a lower schooling and vocational
education level than husbands. For example 15% of the husbands in the sam-
ple have a polytechnic or university degree, but only 8% of the wives. The
main financial resource of single men and women is earnings. The unearned
income can be negative because of maintenance payments to children, par-
ents or ex-partner.7 Men pay on average more maintenance than women. A
high proportion of singles has positive capital income. In contrast, only few
of the singles in our sample receive social benefits.
More than half of the married couples live with at most 1 child. Similarly
to singles, only few couples receive housing or social benefits. Most of them
have capital income. As is the case for singles, married men pay on average
a little more maintenance than married women.
There are no large discrepancies in the distributions of hours of work
between men and single women. Both present a sharp mode around 40
hours. But the distribution of hours of married women is very different.
6This means that we excluded households conmprising other adults than those of the
married couple.
7Admittedly, the fact that maintenance payments may depend on income creates an
endogeneity problem, which we shall neglect here.
10
Married women have a significantly lower participation rate than married
men or singles, and the distribution of their labour supply is spread more
evenly. Married women work more often in part-time jobs, and their weekly
working time distribution has a mode at 20 hours.
5 A ‘collective’ baseline situation for Germany
To obtain a data set representing the collective world for Germany, we pro-
ceed as follows. In a first step we estimate preference parameters for single
men and women and then predict their labour supply and the correspond-
ing consumption level. This involves also the estimation of wage equations.
In the second step we use a calibration method to determine the partners’
relative weights in the bargaining processes taking place in the household,
and to compute a leisure interaction coefficient describing the effect of the
leisure of the spouse on each individual’s utility. The calibration is done by
optimising the fit of predicted to observed hours of work. By introducing
a cross leisure term we relax the strong assumption of separability of indi-
vidual preferences in the pairs (cf , lf ) , (cm, lm) which is usually made in the
empirical literature on collective models. Apart from this cross leisure term
we assume that married individuals have the same preference parameters as
singles.
We resort to calibration in order to avoid the difficult task of estimat-
ing a collective model with non-convex budget sets and non-participation,
but the path followed here could eventually be extended from calibration to
estimation, the crucial identifying assumption being the similarity of prefer-
ences of individuals before and after marriage. In the simpler context of two
earner households and linearised budget restrictions, this approach was also
followed by Barmby and Smith (2001).
5.1 Step 1: Estimation of preference parameters for
singles
5.1.1 Wage equations
In order to obtain wage rates for the whole population, including those
not working, we estimate wage equations separately for women and men.
We posit a linear normal selection model and use the maximum likelihood
method for women and the two-step Heckman procedure for men.8 We tried
8A linear normal selection model combines two latent linear regression models with
jointly normal errors independent of the regressors. The observation rule states that only
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics on the selected samples
single single mar. mar.
w. men w. men
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
participation .94 .96 .71 .97
age 37.2 9.44 36.7 7.98 39.5 7.04 41.9 7.34
schooling(a)
no degree .03 (e) .04 .02 .01
short secondary .34 .35 .41 .31
long secondary .23 .21 .12 .19
other .03 .02 .06 .06
voc. training(b)
no training .13 .06 .10 .05
technical training .21 .18 .24 .25
univ. or polytech. .14 .18 .08 .15
East Germany .14 .20 .28 .28
separ. or divorced .27 .32
never married .66 .68
widowed .07 .00
# children 0 0 1.40 1.06 1.40 1.06
no children 1 1 .22 .22
1 child 0 0 .31 .31
2 children 0 0 .36 .36
≥ 3 children (#)(c) 3.39 .28 3.39 .28
hours work (week) 36.8 5.65 38.9 6.40 30.1 10.4 39.6 5.53
gross wage (hour) 13.1 4.75 14.6 5.75 11.6 5.17 15.6 6.56
capital income 40.1 72.1 42.4 74.9 52.1 143.5 52.1 143.5
child benefit 131.2 45.9 147.6 64.2 206.0 124.8 206.0 124.8
total unearned inc.
(month)(f) 49.5 195.5 30.4 234.2 321.9 459.1 321.9 459.1
observations 208 280 1332 1332
Notes: (a) reference category: primary school; short and long secondary school
correspond to ‘Realschulabschluß’ and ‘Abitur’; (b) reference category: appren-
ticeship; technical training and polytechnic correspond to ‘Fachschule’ and ‘Fach-
hochschule’; (c) for this and the four subsequent variables, statistics concern only
positive values; (d) nominal variables in euro; (e) variables for which only the mean
is shown are indicator variables; (f) total unearned income also includes rental and
leasing, social benefit, housing benefit, incomes of children and net maintenance
payments; highly negative net maintenance may lead to negative total unearned
income.
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Table 3: Wage equations for singles
women men
coef. std.err. t-value coef. std.err. t-value
East -.35 .06 -5.6 -.41 .05 -8.6
a40 .37 .12 3.0 .01 .002 4.2
a40_child -.14 .06 -2.3
sch_reabi .11 .04 2.5
job_noap -.16 .04 -3.7
job_fach .17 .05 3.0
job_uni .21 .06 3.4 .28 .06 4.5
constant 2.22 .11 19.8 2.22 .10 22.8
(uncensored) obs. 178 222
-76.03 (log likelihood) .31 (adj. R-squared)
Notes: dependent variable: log hourly wage rate; East: person lives in Eastern
Germany. a40: age divided by 40. a40_child: interaction a40 × child where
child indicates that a woman has born at least one child. sch_reabi: at least
middle secondary school. job_noap: no vocational training. job_fach: technical
training. job_uni: polytechnic or university degree.
a number of different estimation methods, including also two step methods
with other regressors than the predicted normal hazard used in the Heckman
approach, but the choices mentioned above gave the most accurate predic-
tions for working singles.
The results reported in Table 3 were obtained with a descending specifi-
cation search. The variable ensuring identification of the selection process is
gross unearned income, which is significant in the participation equation for
both men and women. The results indicate that wages are on average lower
in East Germany. Mothers have lower wages too, even though the children
do not live in the household in our sample. This effect may be related to the
negative impact of career interruptions (see e.g. Beblo and Wolf, 2002). Not
surprisingly, a higher level of education has a positive impact on wages. In
Table 4 we see that the estimated gross hourly wage of German single men
is on average almost one euro higher than for single women.
the sign of the first variable is observed, and that the second variable is observed only
when the first one is positive. Regressors are always observed.
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Table 4: Wages for singles
no. mean sd.d. min. 10% 50% 90% max.
wf 208 13.29 5.46 6.02 8.88 12.10 17.84 56.29
wm 280 14.32 5.52 3.42 8.59 13.11 21.69 35.67
Notes: wi represents i’s wage rate, with i = f,m. These are the actual wage rate
for those people the information in available in the GSOEP, and predictions for all
other observations, obtained taking account of the estimated variance of the log
wage.
5.1.2 Preferences of single women and men
We estimate preference parameters separately for women and men. We as-
sume linear expenditure system (LES)-type preferences:
Ui (ci, li) = β
i
c ln (ci − ci) + βil ln
¡
li − li
¢
i = f,m, (1)
where ci represents consumption (i.e. disposable income in this static model)
and li demand for leisure. c¯i and li are respectively the ‘minimum’ require-
ments in consumption and leisure. Instead of estimating these, which proved
difficult, we chose to calibrate them, as done also by Barmby and Smith
(2001). Details are given in the next subsection. We do not impose the
constraint βic + β
i
l = 1 in the estimation, but check that the estimates are
positive, which allows a posteriori to rescale the utility function by βic + β
i
l.
An alternative specification with βic = F (ziγ), where F denotes the logistic
cumulative distribution function, and ziγ a linear index depending on char-
acteristics for individual i, used for instance by Hoynes (1996), led to much
lower likelihood values.9
The budget constraint is defined as:
ci = g (li, wi, yi,φi) i = f,m, (2)
where wi and yi are i’s wage rate and i’s unearned income, respectively, φi
represents a vector of characteristics relevant to the tax system, and the
function g expresses the German tax and redistribution system.
For the estimation, we use a multinomial logit model with mass points on
the consumption coefficients in order to account for unobserved heterogeneity
(see Heckman and Singer, 1984, and Hoynes, 1996).10 We suppose that each
9It is worth noting that (a) the two specifications are non-nested, and (b) the cardinal-
isation associated with division by βic + βil depends on individual characteristics.
10We also estimated a random parameter logit model (RPL, see e.g. Mc Fadden and
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person has K alternative values hk for his/her weekly labour supply, leading
to leisure choices lk = T − hk, where T is the total time available: 168 hours
a week. We choose K = 7, and the following set of possible values for hk: 0,
10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60.
The contribution to the likelihood for person i choosing combination¡
cji , l
j
¢
is:
L =
RX
r=1
pr
exp
£
βicr ln
¡
cji − ci
¢
+ βil ln
¡
lj − li
¢¤PK
k=1 exp
£
βicr ln
¡
cki − ci
¢
+ βil log
¡
lk − li
¢¤ (3)
where R denotes the number of mass points, pr the probability associated
with mass point (or regime) r in the mixture. Estimation results will be
produced for three mass points: this appears sufficient for our data, given
the heavy dominance of one of the regimes for both preference estimations,
single women as well as single men.
In order to ensure that the probabilities pr do lie between 0 and 1, we
adopt the following ‘logit’ parameterisation:
pr = exp(er)/
h
1 +
PR−1
s=1 exp(es)
i
r = 1, . . . , R− 1,
pR = 1−
PR−1
s=1 ps.
(4)
5.1.3 Calibration of minimum consumption and leisure for singles
The minimum consumption, ci, is calibrated as the lowest disposable income
(eci) over the hours choices listed above, over the whole sample, minus c0i =
1. The latter number was obtained by grid search for the value of c0i that
maximises the likelihood. We have cf = ecf − c0f = −118.61 and cm = ecm −
c0m = −144.57 for women and men, respectively. The minimum consumption
is negative because of maintenance payments, even if the actual disposable
income corresponding to the optimal or observed choice is positive. Minimum
leisure, li, is set uniformly to 94 hours a week for women (lf = 94), that is 10.2
hours of daily physiological regeneration and almost 3.3 hours for household
work. It is set to 87 hours for single men (lm = 87) weekly, that is 10
hours a day of physiological regeneration and 2.4 hours for household work.
These numbers refer to results drawn from the German Time Budget Survey
1991/1992 (see Beblo, 2001, and Statistisches Bundesamt, 1995).
Train, 2000) with a normal distribution for the constant terms in βic and βil. We obtained
significant dispersion for the consumption term, but not for the leisure term, both for men
and women. The specification with mass points on βic alone strongly dominated the RPL
specification, both in terms of likelihood and in terms of accuracy of predictions.
Note that an ordered model would be out of place here, because of the complex budget
restriction.
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Table 5: Mixed multinomial logit estimates for single women: three mass
points
robust
coef. std.err. t-value
βfl0 ln
¡
lf − lf
¢
38.29 4.11 9.3
βflsra ln
¡
lf − lf
¢× sch_reabi 4.69 1.24 3.8
βflE ln
¡
lf − lf
¢× East -20.31 5.16 -3.9
βfcK ln (cf − cf)× kid -10.58 3.41 -3.1
βfcjn ln (cf − cf)× job_noap 6.48 3.75 1.7
βfcE ln (cf − cf)×East -22.88 11.1 -2.1
βfc1 ln (cf − cf), regime 1 31.25 5.64 5.5
βfc2 ln (cf − cf), regime 2 75.99 8.16 9.3
βfc3 ln (cf − cf), regime 3 13.96 3.34 4.2
e1 ‘logit’ regime 1 -1.44 0.73 -2.0
e2 ‘logit’ regime 2 2.55 0.24 10.5
log lik. R = 3 -170.91
log lik. R = 2 -172.44
log lik. mult. logit -287.97
Notes: see Table 3. kid has value 1 if the woman has born a child, pays maintenance
to a child, or receives child benefit. e1 and e2 parameterise the probabilities of the
three mass points (regimes). See equation (4).
5.1.4 Estimated preference parameters for singles
Tables 5 and 6 report maximum likelihood estimation results based on equa-
tion (3) for three mass points for single women and men. These results were
obtained using analytical gradients and hessian.11 The last row of each table
shows the log likelihood value obtained with the multinomial logit model,
which does not allow for unobserved heterogeneity, and for two and three
mass points. The improvement when allowing for unobserved heterogeneity
is very large, especially for women. Moving from two to three mass points
leads to a significant improvement in both cases, but a larger one for men.
The interpretation of the coefficients is not straightforward, since the
propensities to consume and to demand leisure are related to them in a
non-linear way. These propensities are obtained as Bij = β
i
j/
¡
βic + β
i
l
¢
for
11Obtaining these estimates proved difficult. We used sequentially numerical gradients,
then analytical gradients, and finally the analytical hessian also, and iterated until esti-
mates were identical with all three methods.
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Table 6: Mixed multinomial logit estimates for single men: three mass points
robust
coef. std.err. t-value
βml0 ln
¡
lm − lm
¢
10.70 5.62 1.9
βmla ln
¡
lm − lm
¢× ln(age) 4.52 1.55 2.9
βmljn ln
¡
lm − lm
¢× job_noap -13.70 4.94 -2.8
βmlE ln
¡
lm − lm
¢×East -17.45 4.01 -4.4
βmcjn ln (cm − cm)× job_noap -18.24 8.32 -2.2
βmcE ln (cm − cm)×East -24.96 7.25 -3.4
βmc1 ln (cm − cm), regime 1 93.09
βmc2 ln (cm − cm), regime 2 44.03 2.58 17.1
βmc3 ln (cm − cm), regime 3 11.71 1.99 5.9
e1 ‘logit’, regime 1 -.45 .38 -1.2
e2 ‘logit’, regime 2 2.71 .21 12.5
log lik. R = 3 -322.03
log lik. R = 2 -340.62
log lik. mult. logit -405.13
Notes: see Table 5. age is age in years. No variance was obtained for parameter
βmc1 but the improvement over mp = 2 in both the log likelihood value and the
accuracy of predictions was sufficient to let us prefer estimates obtained with three
mass points; results for other coefficients are close enough to those obtained for
two mass points to be trusted.
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Table 7: Marginal propensities for singles
no. mean std. dev. min. 10% 50% 90% max.
Bfc 208 .62 .10 .19 .42 .64 .66 .75
Bfl 208 .38 .11 .25 .32 .36 .58 .81
Bmc 279 .64 .09 .29 .61 .63 .71 .90
Bml 279 .36 .10 .10 .22 .37 .39 .71
Note: One of the men had a negative predicted propensity to consume and was
ignored in the sequel.
Table 8: Elasticities for single women
no. mean s.d. min. 10% 50% 90% max.
price (c) 208 -1.15 .15 -1.90 -1.20 -1.11 -1.08 -1.03
income (c) 208 2.40 .33 1.94 2.17 2.30 2.61 4.06
income (h) 208 -2.01 1.52 -13.17 -2.36 -1.65 -1.51 -1.06
wage (h) 208 .30 .23 -.21 .18 .26 .42 2.33
Note: c denotes the consumption and h the working hours.
i = f,m, and j = c, l, and their distributions are described in Table 7.
We use the propensities reported in Table 7 to compute elasticities at
observed hours for the predicted regime (see next subsection), by linearising
the budget constraint at that point for each individual. The elasticities are
given in Tables 8 and 9.
While the price and wage elasticities are not unusual compared to the
literature, the income elasticities are large in absolute value, possibly because
of our inclusion of maintenance payments in unearned income.
Table 9: Elasticities for single men
no. mean s.d. min. 10% 50% 90% max.
price (c) 279 -1.15 .13 -2.00 -1.19 -1.13 -1.08 -1.04
income (c) 279 2.16 .29 1.43 1.96 2.14 2.33 3.81
income (h) 279 -1.73 .74 -5.97 -2.10 -1.74 -.92 -.37
wage (h) 279 .37 .27 .01 .20 .32 .48 2.63
Note: see Table 8.
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Table 10: Frequencies and estimated probabilies for the regimes
women men
regime est. prob. frequency est. prob. frequency
1 .02 .08 .04 .14
2 .91 .88 .90 .82
3 .07 .04 .06 .04
Notes: the estimated probabilities result from the estimation procedure. The
frequencies correspond to the regime which gives the best labour supply prediction.
5.1.5 Predicted hours for singles
In the computation of the optimal predicted labour supply of each single
in the sample, for each individual we choose the regime (or mass point) r
which gives the best prediction. When several regimes give predictions with
the same absolute deviation from the observed labour supply, we keep the
regime which yields normalised marginal propensity Bic (see definition above)
closest to 0.5, in order to avoid the ocurrence of values near 0 or 1. Table 10
reports the resulting frequencies for the ‘chosen’ regimes.
From the estimates for e1 and e2 we see (but this can be read more clearly
from Table 10) that regime 2, which corresponds to the highest value of βfc
and to the second highest value of βmc , has the highest probability in both
cases (men and women).
The regime frequencies obtained are not in stark contradiction with the es-
timated probabilities, although regime 1 appears to be chosen too often. Ta-
bles 11 and 12 show cross tabulations of predicted discretised hours (columns)
against actual discretised hours (rows).
For both men and women, the observed marginal distribution of hours
worked is fairly accurately reproduced, with the exception of some non-
working men predicted to work full-time.
5.2 Step 2: Calibration of the cross-leisure term and
the power index
Once we have obtained estimates of the preference parameters for women and
men, we calibrate the couple-specific parameters, that is the power index and
the cross-leisure term, since these parameters cannot yet be estimated.
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Table 11: Actual versus predicted labour supply for single women
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 total
0 5.29 .48 5.77
10 .96 .96 1.92
20 .48 .48 .96 .48 2.40
30 2.40 .96 4.33 7.69
40 1.92 1.92 76.44 .96 81.25
50 .96 .96
60 .00
total 5.77 3.37 4.33 2.88 82.69 .96 .00 208
Notes: rows: actual (discretised) labour supply, columns: predicted labour supply.
Entries in the body of the table and in the margins give frequencies (in %), except
the last cell which gives the number of observations. The proportion of exact
predictions is 84.61%, and the proportion of ‘adjacent’ predictions is 12.03%. The
bad predictions (the rest) represent 3.36% of all observations.
Table 12: Actual versus predicted labour supply for single men
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 total
0 2.15 .36 1.43 .36 4.30
10 .00
20 1.43 .36 .36 1.79 3.94
30 .36 2.51 .36 3.23
40 .36 67.74 8.96 1.79 78.85
50 .36 1.43 4.30 6.09
60 1.08 2.51 3.59
total 2.15 2.15 .72 .36 73.83 12.19 8.60 279
Notes: see Table 11. The proportion of exact predictions is 74.19%, and the
proportion of ‘adjacent’ predictions is 19.36%. The bad predictions (the rest)
represent 6.45% of all observations.
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5.2.1 Wage equations
As for singles, we estimate wage equations separately for wives and husbands.
The following conceptual difficulty arises here due to selectivity: a participa-
tion model would need to be based on the collective framework, which is dif-
ficult. Lewbel (2000) proposes an estimation method for the selection model
which does not require the specification of the selection mechanism. The
method relies on the existence of a variable which is monotonically related
with the selection variable: in the case of participation, household unearned
income is a plausible candidate. For the wives, we use the simplest of the
estimators proposed by Lewbel. For men we apply OLS, as the selectivity
problem is much less severe for them, so that the OLS predictions are more
accurate than those based on the Lewbel estimator. Results are gathered in
Appendix A.
5.2.2 Preferences of individuals in couples
We assume that a person, once married, retains basically the same preferences
as in the single status. An additional term in the utility function is the
interaction in log leisures. We thus assume the following functional form for
the utility function of spouse i in household h, parameterised by a vector zh
of variables related to children in the household, and by the spouse’s leisure
lj:
Ui (ci, li; zh, lj) = β
i
c ln [ci − ci (zh)] + βil ln
£
li − li (zh)
¤
+ δi (zh) ln
£
lf − lf (zh)
¤
ln
£
lm − lm (zh)
¤
∀ i, j = f,m,
(5)
where δi (zh) represents the cross leisure effect on the spouses’ utilities. The
presence of δ means that we do not restrict our attention to ‘egoistic’ or
‘caring’ agents (see Chiappori 1988). Ui (ci, li; zh, lj) is increasing in ci and li
if
βic > 0,
βil + δi (zh) ln
£
lj − lj (zh)
¤
> 0.
(6)
This utility function is concave in (ci, li) if it is increasing in these argu-
ments. As mentioned above, we assume that the β coefficients are unaffected
by marriage and obtain them from the estimates for singles. In a first step we
will calibrate a δh for each household (temporarily adopting the restriction
δf (zh) ≡ δm (zh)) and a ‘power index’ ωhm which will be defined precisely
in Subsection 5.2.4, so as to optimize the fit of predicted hours to observed
hours. In the same way as for the singles, we calibrate the minimum require-
ments in consumption and leisure ci (zh) and li (zh).
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5.2.3 Calibration of minimum consumption and leisure for couples
In order to account for the impact of children on time use, as well as on con-
sumption, we calibrate minimum expenditures and leisure times for couples,
using equivalence scales as used for social benefit payments in Germany. We
thereby draw on information from the German Ministry of Labour. As to
the minimum time needs of children of different ages we refer to the results
of the German time budget survey already used for singles.
The minimum consumption, c, is calibrated as for the singles: for all
possible choices of working hours of the couple, the household’s weekly dis-
posable income is computed, and the sample minimum is taken (ec = 292.52
euro per week). To account for the minimum needs of children in the house-
hold, the minimum consumption for each partner, ci, is then set equal to half
of ec minus c0i = 153 divided by the household equivalence number heq, i.e.:12
ci = ec/2− c0i /heq. (7)
The household equivalence number varies with the number and age of chil-
dren, and thereby approximates the social benefit equivalence scale in Ger-
many. Each child under age 7 is assigned a weight of 0.4, children between
7 and 15 are weighted by 0.5 and older children still living in the household
are given a weight of 0.6. We set c0i = 153 so that the father and mother
of one ten year old child will both have subtracted c0i /heq = 153/1.5 = 102,
instead of c0i = 153 in the childless household. As a result, their minimum
consumption is 51 euro higher per week, which corresponds to the increase
in minimum needs caused by an additional child as officially assigned to
low-income households by the governmental authorities (Statistisches Bun-
desamt, 2003). Note that minimum consumption in a household without
children is negative, just as for singles.
The minimum amount of leisure in the absence of children in the house-
hold is set to 87 and 94 hours for husband and wife, respectively, as for
singles. To account for some minimum requirement of household production
associated with child care, these hours are altered depending on the age of
children living in the household. According to the results of a study on the
leisure time of German couples (see Beblo, 2001, and Statistisches Bunde-
samt, 1995), for a full-time working man household time increases by 0.8
hours per day if he is living together with at least one child up to age 6. For
a full-time working woman this rise in time requirement amounts to about
2 hours. Therefore, in our calculation, the father’s weekly minimum leisure
is increased by 6 hours, the mother’s by 14 hours, if at least one child up to
12The justification for the choice of the number 153 is given below.
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age 6 is present. For older children, that is, if all children are aged between
7 and 12, 3 hours are added to the father’s (7 times 0.4 hours per day) and 7
hours are added to the mother’s minimum leisure (7 times 1 hour per day) —
again as suggested by the respective changes of household time for this group
in the German time use data.
5.2.4 Determining the Pareto frontier
In earlier stages of this work we obtained the optimal choice of hours associ-
ated with a (δ,ω) for each household by maximising a convex combination of
individual utilities, ω being the parameter of the convex combination. This
approach is adapted to the case where the household’s Pareto frontier is con-
cave to the origin (or the utility set is convex). But as a consequence of the
nonconvexity of many budget sets, the utility sets of many of the concerned
households turn out not to be convex (see e.g. Mas-Colell et al., 1995). Thus,
in order to capture all behavioural possibilities, we must adopt another ap-
proach than the simple maximisation of a household social welfare function
defined as a convex combination of individual utility functions. The proce-
dure adopted consists in determining the Pareto frontier and, for a given δ,
searching for that point of the frontier which corresponds best to observed
behaviour.13
The details of our version of the procedure are as follows:
1. Define by Umaxm the maximum utility the husband can reach, considering
all labour supply combinations of husband and wife, and all consump-
tion shares with one decimal point between 0.1 and 0.9.14 Uminm is the
husband’s utility level when his wife has Umaxf . U
max
m and U
min
m can be
considered as the utility levels the husband reaches when he or his wife
is in a dictatorial position, respectively.
2. SelectK+1 points on the Pareto frontier with the following coordinates
on the horizontal axis:
Ukm = U
min
m +
k
K
¡
Umaxm − Uminm
¢
for k = 0, ..., K.
We choose K = 50. A simple index of the male’s bargaining power is
then: ωm = k/K. Recall that this concept is central in our approach
to the collective model.
13The procedure was elaborated jointly by the authors and by Frederic Vermeulen.
See also the theoretical description in Varian (1992, p.562). However, to the best of our
knowledge, graphs like those reproduced in Figures 2 and 3 are the first empirical examples
in the literature.
14Moving to two decimal points barely changed the results.
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3. For each point k, the wife maximises her utility Ukf given her husband’s
Ukm and the budget constraint:
max
c,p,lf ,lm
Ukf (8)
s.t.
½
Um ≥ Ukm
c ≤ g (lf , lm, wf , wm, y,φ)
,
where c is the couple’s consumption.
4. The couple’s choice, given a value of the power index ωm, a value of
cross leisure effect δ and values for the regimes rf and rm, is:
(lf (ωm, δ, rf , rm) , lm (ωm, δ, rf , rm) , c (ωm, δ, rf , rm) , p (ωm, δ, rf , rm)) ,
where p represents the wife’s consumption share, i.e. the part of c the
wife consumes.
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Figure 2: A convex utility set (Um on the horizontal axis, Uf on the vertical
axis)
Approximately only 42% of the households in our sample turn out to have
a convex utility set, or, in other words, a concave Pareto frontier. Figures 2
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Figure 3: A non convex utility set (Um on the horizontal axis, Uf on the
vertical axis)
and 3 document two Pareto frontiers obtained in our sample, a concave one
and non-concave one.15
5.2.5 Calibration of the cross-leisure term and the power index
Denoting W the set of possible values for the combination (ωm, δ, rf , rm),
taking account of the restriction on δ ensuring regularity of preferences, i.e.
condition (6), an optimal value of the combination satisfies:¡
ωm, δ, rf , rm
¢
∈ argmin
W
n£
h∗f − hf (ωm, δ, rf , rm)
¤2
+ [h∗m − hm (ωm, δ, rf , rm)]
2
o
,
(9)
where h∗i denotes i’s actual labour supply. We only consider relative integer
values of δ. In case of multiple solutions, we select the combination for
which, lexicographically, ωm is closest to ωf (where ωf is the female’s power
index, defined as ωf =
¡
U¯f − Uminf
¢
/
¡
Umaxf − Uminf
¢
), δ is closest to 0 and
the sum of the regime probabilities estimated for the singles is the largest.
15The empirical Pareto frontiers (Figures 2 and 3) has been obtained in solving system
(8) for each k = 0, ...,K (K = 50).
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In order to normalise the power indices of the spouses so that they sum to
one, while taking account of the degree of concavity of the Pareto-frontier at
the optimum, we compute the variable α solving ωαf +ω
α
m = 1 and use ω
α
m as
normalised power index for the male. The distribution of α is documented
in Table 15.
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Figure 4: Distribution of the calibrated normalised power index of the man
In order to obtain hours predictions from the collective model, we solve
the problem (8) for each household, for given preferences (including δ, rf and
rm) and power index (ωm).
5.2.6 Predicting the power index
We now turn to the estimation of a logistic equation relating the calibrated
normalised power index ω¯αm to a set of explanatory variables, that is, an
equation of the type ln [ω¯αm/ (1− ω¯αm)] = xγ+², which will allow us to obtain
predicted values ωˆαm between 0 and 1 given x. Important variables to include
in x are variables capturing the way in which the tax benefit system influences
the relative earning potential of the spouses. If these turn out to contribute
significantly to the prediction of ω¯αm, they will allow us to describe changes in
the power index induced by tax reforms. Here we consider two such variables,
y40d and y
20
d defined as follows.
16 Let pkf and p
k
m denote the observed sample
16Thanks to Richard Blundell for this idea.
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frequencies of (discretised) weekly labour supplies hk of wives and husbands,
respectively. Denote Rfk
0
mk the household disposable income when the husband
works hk hours and the wife works hk
0
hours. Variable y40f defined as:
y40f =
KX
k=1
pkm
³
Rf40mk −R
f0
mk
´
(10)
then measures the expected increase in the household disposable income if
the wife switches from 0 to 40 hours, the expectation being taken over the
male hours distribution. Defining y20f and y
40
m similarly, we then consider
the two ratios y40d =y
40
f /y
40
m and y
20
d =y
20
f /y
40
m which we term ‘relative earning
potential of the wife at 40 hours’ (resp. 20).
The initial list of explanatory variables x we started with in the logistic
regression included, beside y20d , y
40
d and the age difference variable reported
in the table, income variables like capital income and child benefits, and a
whole set of socio-demographic variables. But the only variables surviving
the descending specification searches conducted separately for East and West
Germany are given in Table 13. Using variables y20d , y
20
f , y
40
f and y
40
m instead
or on top of y40d proved inferior. An optimistic interpretation of the result that
basically only the relative earnings potential variable plays a role, would be
that observable heterogeneity has been satisfactorily dealt with in the wage
and preference specifications.
5.3 Step 3: Re-calibration of the individual cross-leisure
terms
Hours predictions obtained with the predicted ωˆαm and calibrated δ¯ turn out
not to be very accurate. We thus choose to re-calibrate separate leisure
interaction terms δm and δf for husband and wife given the predicted power
index ωˆαm. The couple solves the following program:
max
c,p,lf ,lm
Uf (11)
s.t.
½
Um ≥ U˜m
c ≤ g (lf , lm, wf , wm, y,φ)
,
where U˜m is such that:
U˜m = U
min
m + ωˆm
¡
Umaxm − Uminm
¢
,
and the utility function Ui is given as follows:
Ui = β
i
c log (ci − ci (zh)) + βil log
¡
li − li (zh)
¢
+ δi (zh) log
¡
lf − lf (zh)
¢
log
¡
lm − lm (zh)
¢
∀ i = f,m. (12)
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Table 13: Logistic regression results for the power index
East Germany West Germany
parameter coef. s.e. t-value coef. s.e. t-value
y40d -.16 .02 -6.20
age -.01 .00 -2.81 -.01 .00 -2.89
dage .01 .01 3.69
sch_real .11 .04 2.98
sch_abi .13 .05 2.73
job_noap -.56 .15 -3.66
job_fach .06 .02 3.37
nchild .06 .02 3.19
child0 -.37 .08 -4.40 -.24 .02 -9.95
child3 -.16 .05 -3.05 -.11 .02 -5.49
child7 -.04 .03 -1.56
child16 -.05 .02 -2.73
constant -.01 .11 -.02 .22 .07 3.31
adj. R-squared .126 .196
Note: y40d : her relative earning potential at 40 hours, taking account of the tax
system, as explained in the text; age: her age, dage: her age minus his age;
sch_real, sch_reabi, job_noap and job_fach: indicator variables for short sec-
ondary schooling, long secondary schooling, no vocational degree, technical train-
ing, and polytechnic or university degree, respectively; nchild: number of children;
child0, child3, child7 and child16 : number of children in the household less than
3 years old, between 3 and 6 years, between 7 and 12 years and over 16 years,
respectively.
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Table 14: Regime frequencies for couples after re-calibration
regime 1 regime 2 regime 3
r¯f .025 .880 .095
r¯m .057 .938 .005
We allow for different cross leisure terms for both partners. Thus the
couple’s choice (lf , lm, c, p) now depends on the combination (δf , δm, rf , rm).
As for the first computation, the optimal combination
¡
δf , δm, rf , rm
¢
satisfies¡
δ¯f , δ¯m, rf , rm
¢
∈ argmin
W
n£
h∗f − hf (δf , δm, rf , rm)
¤2
+ [h∗m − hm (δf , δm, rf , rm)]
2
o
.
(13)
Table 14 shows the new regime (or mass point) frequencies. The most fre-
quently chosen regime is the second one for each spouse (like for singles). The
results are very similar to those for the regimes picked in the first calibration,
although the exotic regimes are chosen a little more often.
Table 15 documents the results of the re-calibration of δ¯ and ωˆαm. The
cross leisure effect δ¯f turns out to be negative for most women. This was not
what we expected when introducing the leisure interaction term, we rather
expected to find a majority of households with complementary leisures. The
result that leisures are substitutes (in direct utility) for so many women
may be partly due to the inappropriateness of the way in which we import
the β coefficients estimated for singles into the preferences of individuals in
couples and to the insufficiency of our efforts to distinguish between domestic
production and leisure time. Further research is needed here. δ¯f increases
with the number of children, the exception being that mothers of a single
child present the largest average. The cross leisure effect for men, δ¯m, is
positive on average. As for women, it increases with the number of children,
except that childless men have the same average coefficient as fathers of two
children. In our model, the asymmetry in the labour supplies of husbands
and wives thus translates into an asymmetry in the impact of the spouse’s
leisure on utility, rather than in asymmetry in bargaining power: indeed, the
power index values obtained suggest a balanced power sharing in German
households.
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Table 15: Statistics on re-calibrated cross leisure effects and ωˆm
no child 1 child 2 child. ≥ 3 child. total
mean mean mean mean mean s.d. min. max.
δ¯f -4.17 -3.34 -3.63 -3.43 -3.63 3.22 -12 6
δ¯m .21 .02 0.21 .62 .19 2.23 -8 6
ωˆαm .52 .49 .51 .53 .51 .08 .33 .93
no. 296 410 478 148 1332
Table 16: Female actual vs. predicted labour supply using ωˆm, δf and δm
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 total
0 28.38 .15 28.53
10 .30 5.63 5.93
20 1.43 15.09 16.52
30 2.10 10.21 .08 12.39
40 2.93 33.18 .08 36.19
50 .30 .30
60 .15 .15
total 28.68 7.21 17.19 13.14 33.26 .38 .15 1332
Note: rows: actual, columns: predicted.
5.4 Hours predictions and baseline situation for cou-
ples
Tables 16 and 17 show cross tabulations of actual versus predicted hours
obtained with the estimated ωˆm and the calibrated δf and δm.
The predictions are very accurate: both for wives and for husbands al-
most 90% of the observations are located on the diagonal. However, the fit
deteriorates considerably if we use predicted rather than calibrated values of
the cross leisure effects δi.17 In view of these results, we decided to use the
calibrated values of the leisure interaction terms, rather than their predic-
tions, in the definition of the baseline situation to be used in simulating the
effects of fiscal reforms.
17Less than 29% of the labour supplies of wives are correctly predicted. The percentage
for the husbands is much higher, but still, we obain very bad predictions for some men:
for example, 2.4% of the husbands are predicted to work full time although they actually
do not work. These deviations may be due to factors we are not able to control for, such
as health condition, or wealth.
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Table 17: Male actual vs. predicted labour supply using ωˆm , δf and δm
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 total
0 3.15 3.15
10 .38 .38
20 .08 .23 .30
30 .15 1.50 1.65
40 .08 8.56 76.50 85.14
50 .08 2.25 3.30 5.63
60 .75 2.85 .15 3.75
total 3.15 .45 .45 10.14 79.50 6.16 .15 1332
Note: see Table 16.
6 Analysis of a tax reform with the collective
model
We analyse the welfare effects of the switch from joint to individual taxa-
tion. This reform entails a replacement of joint with individual taxation on
the basis of the 1998 tax schedule. Tax liabilities are scaled down by a factor
f = .942 in order to obtain revenue neutrality, at least approximately. The
computation takes account of singles and of sampling weights. Specifically,
denoting Ro the baseline government tax revenue, and R (f) the post-reform
tax revenue for factor f given behavioural adjustments, we solve equation
R (f) = Ro in f. This is a conceptually simple problem, but given the com-
plexity of the function R (f) it is numerically burdensome, and we chose to
stop the iterative algorithm after a small number of iterations, yielding the
solution up to the third decimal position.
It is important to note that the definition of a revenue neutral reform will
differ if it is based on the unitary rather than on the collective model, because
predicted behavioural adjustments will differ between the two models.
6.1 Simulation results
6.1.1 Changes in the power index
Recall that the predicted power index depends on a variable which reflects
the wife’s relative earning potential at 40 hours, taking account of the com-
plete tax system. Thus the power index is potentially affected by a tax
reform. Table 18 summarises its distribution for the two tax-benefit systems
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Table 18: Estimated normalised power index for the two tax-benefit systems
no. mean s.d. min. 10% 50% 90% max.
ωˆαjointm 1332 .510 .076 .333 .428 .496 .609 .927
ωˆαindm 1332 .506 .076 .330 .426 .492 .604 .927
Note: ωˆαjointm and ωˆαindm : normalised power index of male for 1998- and individual
taxation, respectively.
we consider, based on the estimates given in Table 13.18
There is a slight reduction in the mean and in all quantiles of ωˆαm, and
Figure 5 shows that changes are small for all individuals, and that there
are few increases. The reason for this change lies in their improved relative
earning potential y40d connected to the fact that they typically have lower
wages than their husbands. Individual taxation then lowers their marginal
tax rate. Because of this shift of the bargaining position in favour of women,
we expect the reform to be relatively more beneficial for married women than
for married men.
6.1.2 Changes in tax revenues
Table 19 summarises tax revenues from different population subgroups under
the two tax regimes. Marital status is an important determinant of the
direction of change in tax liabilities. The individual tax reform is beneficial
to the singles. Indeed the singles’ tax liability is scaled down by the factor
f = .942. On the other hand, the status quo (splitting system) is favourable
to couples, and even when the spouses adapt their labour supply to the
new situation of individual taxation, couples have higher tax liabilities under
individual taxation.
6.1.3 Changes in participation and labour supply
Tables 20 and 21 compare labour supplies pre an post-reform for wives and
husbands, respectively. The participation rate of married females increases
from 71% to 81% under individual taxation.
Under individual taxation, the labour supply of married women becomes
more concentrated on part-time jobs: 56% are predicted to work between 10
18These predictions are obtained using the baseline distributions of male and female
hours.
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Figure 5: Difference in power index, after - before the reform
Table 19: Tax revenues in billion euro
collective unitary
joint tax ind. tax % change joint tax ind. tax % change
single women 8.92 8.39 -5.9% 8.92 7.99 -10.4%
single men 15.58 14.68 -5.8% 15.58 14.01 -10.1%
couples 44.10 45.54 +3.3% 44.71 47.22 +5.6%
total 68.59 68.61 69.21 69.22
Notes: approximate revenue neutrality is obtained by multiplying the tax liability
in the case of the individual taxationby a factor f = .942 for the collective model
and f = .894 for the unitary model. Tax revenues in billion euro
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Table 20: Wives’ labour supply pre- and post-move to individual taxation
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 total
0 17.64 7.88 2.63 .38 .08 .08 28.68
10 1.13 2.70 2.55 .60 .15 .08 7.21
20 .15 4.65 9.31 2.40 .60 .08 17.19
30 .23 4.88 6.38 1.35 .30 13.14
40 .08 1.13 9.83 18.99 2.70 .53 33.26
50 .15 .23 .38
60 .08 .08 .15
total 18.92 15.54 20.50 19.59 21.32 3.38 .75 1332
Note: rows: pre-reform, columns: post-reform.
Table 21: Husbands’ labour supply pre- and post-move to individual taxation
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 total
0 2.63 .53 3.15
10 .45 .45
20 .08 .38 .45
30 .15 1.35 8.48 .15 10.14
40 .15 .08 7.28 71.85 .15 79.50
50 .45 5.63 .08 6.16
60 .15 .15
total 2.63 1.35 1.80 15.77 72.45 5.78 .23 1332
Note: see Table 20.
and 30 hours, against only 38% pre-reform. However the mode of the hours
distribution remains at 40 hours.
Husbands react less to the reform than their wives do. The participation
rates of married males remain almost the same in all situations (around 97%),
but their labour supply decreases on average: e.g. about 7% are predicted
to move from full time to 30 hours (see Table 21).
Table 22 documents joint variations in labour supply within the house-
hold. A salient feature of this table is that the most frequent cell is (0,0), for
about half of the cases. For 3.3% of the households, there is substitution of
his for her hours of work (his hours decrease and hers increase) while there
is complementarity for 1.4%.
Table 23 summarises the labour supply and consumption effects of the
reform, and Tables 24 and 25 show the change in the situation of households
without children and with three children or more, respectively. The overall
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Table 22: ∆ labour supply of couples, joint - ind. tax.: wives vs. husbands
(collective model)
-30 -20 -10 0 10 total
-30 .08 .08
-20 1.50 1.50
-10 .83 19.89 20.72
0 .08 .23 5.18 49.47 .38 55.33
10 .08 2.18 14.26 .38 16.89
20 .60 3.90 .15 4.65
≥30 .30 .53 .83
total .15 .23 9.16 89.56 .90 1332
Note: rows: wives, columns: husbands.
Table 23: Labour supply and consumption - couples
joint taxation individual taxation
cf 596.2 613.0
hf 21.7 22.2
pf .71 .81
cm 349.2 310.7
hm 38.1 37.2
pm .97 .97
Notes: c, p and h represent average consumption, participation, and hours given
participation, for wives and husbands. 1332 observations.
observation is that women are better off with individual taxation in terms of
consumption and men are worse off, no matter whether children are present
or not.
Singles are less affected by the reform than couples. The corresponding
tables are not shown to save on space.
7 Unitary model: estimation and predictions
For the specification of the unitary model, we adopt the analogue to the
individual utility functions used in the collective model (equation (5)), that
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Table 24: Labour supply and consumption - couples without children
joint taxation individual taxation
cf 679.8 689.2
hf 30.7 28.9
pf .86 .94
cm 405.0 368.2
hm 37.2 36.3
pm .96 .97
Notes: see Table 23. 296 observations.
Table 25: Labour supply and consumption - couples with more than 3 chil-
dren
joint taxation individual taxation
cf 518.5 539.9
hf 10.7 13.5
pf .41 .58
cm 344.3 291.6
hm 37.0 35.4
pm .95 .96
Notes: see Table 23. 148 observations.
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is:
Uˆ (c, lf , lm; z) = βc (z) ln [c− c¯ (z)]
+ βf (z) ln
£
lf − l¯f (z)
¤
+ βm (z) ln
£
lm − l¯m (z)
¤
+ δ (z) ln
£
lf − l¯f (z)
¤
ln
£
lm − l¯m (z)
¤
.
(14)
Note that, by using aggregate consumption as argument in the utility func-
tion, rather than introducing the individual consumptions of husband and
wife as separate argument, we place ourselves in the common situation of
consumption surveys, where only aggregate consumption of the household is
typically available.
Appendix B gives the conditions under which this utility function is in-
creasing in its arguments and concave. Actually, we also experimented with
direct translog utility functions along the lines of Van Soest (1995), but with
a quadratic form in logs of departures from minimal requirements, as in equa-
tion (14). Although several specifications were superior to this one in terms
of likelihood, all led to utility functions that were non-increasing in at least
one argument for a majority of observations.
The β and δ functions of characteristics z are assumed to be linear in
z, and the minimum requirements in consumption and leisure are set to the
values calibrated for the collective model. Of course, the budget constraint
remains the same as for the collective model.
Since each spouse has K labour supply choices, the couple has K2 pos-
sible combinations. If Uˆj = Uˆ
¡
cj , ljf , l
j
m; z
¢
denotes the utility generated by
combination j of the set of combinations
n¡
cj, ljf , l
j
m
¢K2
j=1
o
, adding an error
term εj to the utility derived from combination j, we have:
Uˆj = Uˆ
¡
cj, ljf , l
j
m; z
¢
+ εj ∀ j = 1, ..., K2. (15)
The distribution of εj is assumed to be the extreme value distribution defined
by:
Pr [εj < ε] = exp (− exp (−ε)) , ε ∈ R. (16)
If combination j turns out to be the best possible choice for the family, we
have:
Pr
h
Uˆj > Uˆk, ∀ k 6= j
i
=
exp
h
Uˆ
¡
cj , ljf , l
j
m; z
¢i
PK2
k=1 exp
h
Uˆ
¡
ck, lkf , l
k
m; z
¢i . (17)
The above expression corresponds to the density function of the multinomial
logit model. As for the singles, we also estimate a discrete mixture of such
models, with two to three mass points on the coefficient of ln [c− c¯ (z)] .
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7.1 Estimation results
Table 26 presents estimation results for a model with three mass points.
Although the coefficient corresponding to regime 3 is poorly determined, an
LR test rejects the specification with two mass points, which itself rejects the
MNL specification. However, the gains are lower here than for the estimation
of the preferences of singles. The specification search started with a full set
of houshold and personal characteristics for z in βc and δ and with only
own characteristics plus characteristics of children in βf and βm. Among
the variables z we include information concerning the regimes ‘chosen’ in
the calibration of the collective model (see Table 14). This can be seen here
as a sort of ‘observed unobservable heterogeneity’, and the corresponding
variables turn out to be highly significant (variables reg3f and reg1m). This
may explain why the gain of accounting for unobservable heterogeneity is
lower here than for singles.
Given these parameter estimates, all couples present a positive marginal
utility of the female’s leisure. The concavity condition is fulfilled too. Table
27 gives statistics on the distribution of marginal utilities and of the cross
leisure effect δ. Contrary to the collective model, the latter is positive on
average, although it is negative for 3 couples. Living in Eastern Germany
has a negative effect on this interaction term. Children have a negative
impact on the consumption coefficient. This effect increases if the household
has children less than 6 years old.
7.2 Base case predictions with the unitary model
We assume again that the regime corresponding to a couple is the one which
gives the best labour supply predictions under the condition that it leads
to an increasing utility function. Table 28 shows that the frequencies of
the regimes are more or less in accordance with the estimated probabilities,
although regime 2 is chosen more often than it should. The third regime is
never chosen, as it never satisfies the positivity restrictions on the marginal
utility of consumption.
Tables 29 and 30 show the predictions obtained for wives and husbands.
The unitary model performs less well as the collective model in predicting
labour supplies. Predictions are correct only for a third of the wives and for
45% of the husbands. The margins of the tables are not very well predicted,
except as regards the participation rate. But results for cells within the
tables are very bad. Some large discrepancies occur: for instance, over 3% of
the wives are predicted to work fulltime although they actually do not work.
The unitary model tends to smooth the distribution of the labour supply.
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Table 26: Mixed multinomial logit estimates of preferences for couples: three
mass points
coef. s.e. t-value
βfK ln
¡
lf − lf
¢× kid 5.27 1.15 4.6
βfK6 ln
¡
lf − lf
¢× kid6 1.01 .30 3.4
βfsr ln
¡
lf − lf
¢×sch_realf -.55 .25 -2.2
βfju ln
¡
lf − lf
¢× job_unif .92 .40 2.4
βf
rf3
ln
¡
lf − lf
¢× reg3f 5.02 .52 9.6
βf0 ln
¡
lf − lf
¢
-.80 .70 -1.1
βmK ln
¡
lm − lm
¢× kid 3.15 1.21 2.6
βmju ln
¡
lm − lm
¢× kid6 1.12 .31 3.7
βm0 ln
¡
lm − lm
¢
1.40 .76 1.9
δa2f ln
¡
lf − lf
¢× ln ¡lm − lm¢× (lnagef )2 .12 .01 9.5
δK ln
¡
lf − lf
¢× ln ¡lm − lm¢× kid -1.38 .31 -4.5
δK6 ln
¡
lf − lf
¢× ln ¡lm − lm¢× kid6 -.34 .11 -3.0
δsrf ln
¡
lf − lf
¢× ln ¡lm − lm¢× sch_realf .56 .11 5.0
δsaf ln
¡
lf − lf
¢× ln ¡lm − lm¢× sch_abif .49 .14 3.5
δsam ln
¡
lf − lf
¢× ln ¡lm − lm¢× sch_abim .15 .06 2.6
δjnm ln
¡
lf − lf
¢× ln ¡lm − lm¢× job_noapm -.18 .07 -2.6
δE ln
¡
lf − lf
¢× ln ¡lm − lm¢×East -.56 .04 -12.4
δrf3 ln
¡
lf − lf
¢× ln ¡lm − lm¢× reg3f -1.49 .13 -11.7
βcK ln (c− c¯)× kid -10.82 1.92 -5.6
βcK6 ln (c− c¯)× kid6 -3.77 1.19 -3.2
βcsrf ln (c− c¯)× sch_realf 5.56 1.20 4.6
βcsaf ln (c− c¯)× sch_abif 5.28 1.46 3.6
βc
rf3
ln (c− c¯)× reg3f -16.94 1.25 -13.5
βcrm1 ln (c− c¯)× reg1m 4.21 .97 4.3
βc1 ln (c− c), regime 1 26.94 1.92 14.0
βc2 ln (c− c), regime 2 10.81 3.01 3.6
βc3 ln (c− c), regime 3 -22.39 44.67 -0.5
e1 ‘logit’, regime 1 6.36 .85 7.5
e2 ‘logit’, regime 2 1.58 1.05 1.5
log likelihood R=3 -4218.75
log likelihood R=2 -4224.75
log lik. multinomial logit -4245.56
Notes: kid and kid6 are indicator variables with value 1 if the couple has at least
one child and one child less than 6 years old. sch_realf , sch_realm, sch_abif and
sch_abim are indicator variables with value 1 if the wife (f) or the husband (m) have
short and long secondary schooling. job_unif and job_noapm are indicator variables
with value 1 respectively if the wife has university or college degree and if the husband
has no training. East is an indicator variable with value 1 if the couple lives in East
Germany. reg3f and reg1m are indicator variables with value 1 if respectively the
third consumption regime was the best one for the wife and the first consumption
regime was the best one for the husband in the calibration procedure. (ln agef )
2 is
the square of the logarithmed wife’s age in years.
39
Table 27: Marginal utilities and δ(z) coefficients
mean s. d. min. 10% 50% 90% max.
Uf 7.07 1.46 4.12 5.32 6.86 9.04 12.96
Um 7.33 3.13 .82 3.83 6.53 11.82 19.96
Uc 20.06 10.99 .88 9.78 15.77 38.48 59.11
δ 1.92 1.43 -.23 .56 1.27 4.00 6.42
Note: 1332 observations.
Table 28: Regimes: estimated probabilities and predicted frequencies
regime 1 regime 2 regime 3
estimated probability .990 .008 .002
predicted frequency .947 .053
The mode on full time working is significantly lower for the unitary model,
both for women and men: 80% of the husbands work full time, but only 49%
are predicted to work 40 hours. The labour supplies are underpredicted on
average. This points to the mis-specification of the model, at least concerning
the particular unitary model estimated here, but possibly of any unitary
model.
7.3 Tax reform
We adopt as baseline situation for the unitary model its own predicted labour
supplies. Alternatively, we could have calibrated some preference parameters
in order to obtain predictions coinciding with the collective baseline. Both
approaches have advantages and drawbacks.
We start with the impact of the choice of the unitary representation on
the definition of the reform itself. For the reform to be revenue neutral, we
now have to multiply the tax burden by a factor f = .894. This already
indicates that the unitary model overestimates the reaction of couples to the
tax reform, with regard to labour supplies. The use of the unitary model to
evaluate the tax revenues introduces distortions: while by construction the
overall level is unchanged (because the reform was designed in both cases
to be revenue neutral), the tax burden is predicted to shift from singles to
couples in a much more pronounced way when using the unitary model (See
Table 19). We now examine in turn the positive aspects of the reform (its
impact on observable behaviour) and its normative aspects (its impact on
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Table 29: Collective versus unitary female labour supply, joint taxation
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 total
0 15.99 6.98 3.30 2.10 .30 28.68
10 4.13 .90 1.28 .90 7.21
20 6.76 3.75 3.45 2.48 .75 17.19
30 2.63 1.88 2.78 2.93 2.70 .23 13.14
40 3.30 2.63 3.90 9.23 11.49 2.70 33.26
50 .23 .08 .08 .38
60 .08 .08 .15
total 33.11 16.14 14.71 17.79 15.32 2.93 .00 1332
Note: rows: wives’ collective labour supplies, columns: unitary.
Table 30: Collective versus unitary male labour supply, joint taxation
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 total
0 .45 .60 .30 .23 1.35 .23 3.15
10 .08 .08 .23 .08 .45
20 .15 .30 .45
30 .30 .83 .45 1.20 4.58 2.70 .08 10.14
40 1.35 8.93 3.30 8.71 40.47 16.14 .60 79.50
50 .23 .08 .15 1.73 3.68 .30 6.16
60 .15 .15
total 2.10 10.66 4.13 10.51 48.65 22.97 .98 1332
Note: rows: husbands’ collective labour supplies, columns: unitary.
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Table 31: Participation rates
collective model unitary model
joint individual joint individual
wives 71.33 81.09 76.89 84.68
husbands 96.85 97.38 97.90 98.87
single women 94.23 94.23 94.23 94.23
single men 97.85 97.85 97.85 97.85
welfare).
7.4 Positive aspects of the reform
Recall that the baseline situation used for the unitary model consists of the
predictions obtained from that model. Table 31 compares participation rates
before and after the reform, as predicted by the collective and the unitary
models. Note that for singles the predictions for individual taxation only dif-
fer because of rescaling of the tax scheme (to ensure revenue neutrality). The
largest discrepancies between collective and unitary predictions are obtained
for wives.
Table 32 compares collective and unitary labour supplies after the reform,
for wives. The table for men is omitted to save on space. The predictive
power of the unitary model is limited. For instance 5.48% of the wives are
predicted to work 10 hours under individual taxation, and 6.23% to work 20
hours, whereas they do not work in the collective baseline situation. Overall,
only a third of the wives’ post-reform hours of work are well predicted by the
unitary approach.
Table 33 documents joint variations in the labour supply of husbands and
wives as predicted by the unitary model. As with the actual variations in the
collective setting (see corresponding Table 22) more than half of the couples
do not adjust their hours of work under the new tax rule. Both women and
men are predicted to increase hours more than we would expect from the
results obtained with the collective model. The summary Table 34 compares
the female labour supply adjustments of both models. Whereas the unitary
model seems to predict that women, if any, will rather increase their labour
supply under individual taxation, the collective setting predicts labour supply
changes in both directions. Overall, the reaction in hours worked is slightly
underestimated for the wives - almost 60% of the wives have an unchanged
labour supply according to the unitary model but only 55% in the collective
setting (and overpredicted for the husbands, table not presented here).
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Table 32: Collective vs. unitary female labour supply, individual taxation
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 total
0 5.63 5.48 6.23 1.43 .15 18.92
10 3.08 2.25 6.83 2.85 .53 15.54
20 2.63 3.00 9.01 4.05 1.80 20.50
30 2.40 1.73 3.30 5.71 5.48 .98 19.59
40 1.28 2.40 1.80 4.50 8.41 2.93 21.32
50 .23 .08 .53 1.13 1.05 .38 3.38
60 .08 .08 .30 .23 .08 .00 .75
total 15.32 15.02 27.70 19.97 17.64 4.35 .00 1332
Note: rows: wives’ collective labour supplies, columns: unitary.
Table 33: ∆ labour supply of couples, joint - ind. tax.: wives vs. husbands
(unitary model)
≤-10 0 10 20 ≥30 total
-10 .15 .23 .38
0 3.15 51.73 4.43 .08 59.38
10 6.31 26.28 .90 33.48
20 2.10 2.25 .15 1.13 5.63
≥30 .30 .83 1.13
total 11.56 80.41 5.56 .53 1.96 1332
Note: rows: wives, column: husbands.
Table 34: ∆ female labour supply, joint - ind. tax., collective vs. unitary
-10 0 10 20 ≥30 total
-30 .08 .08
-20 1.20 .60 .08 1.88
-10 13.21 5.48 1.58 .08 20.35
0 .30 33.71 18.32 2.03 .90 55.26
≥10 11.26 9.08 1.96 .15 22.45
total .38 59.38 33.48 5.63 1.13 1332
Note: rows: collective, column: unitary.
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7.5 Normative aspects of the reform
We describe the welfare effects of the reform at the household level, as
measured by the unitary model, by showing the distribution of percentage
changes in household utility for every decile of the pre-reform distribution
of the household equivalent disposable income.19 This graph requires cau-
tious interpretation: we do not mean to suggest that considering percentual
changes permits interhousehold welfare comparisons. But given that the com-
position of deciles refers to the baseline situation, we expect such a graph to
convey a feeling for the importance of welfare effects. What is well defined
in the graph, in terms of welfare comparisons, is the information on propor-
tions of winners and losers by decile. The graph shows the quartiles of the
distribution (box). The lines emerging from the box extend upwards to the
largest utility change smaller than Q75 + 1.5(Q75 - Q25) and downwards to
the smallest utility change larger than Q25 − 1.5(Q75 - Q25). Points outside
this range, if any, are plotted individually.
Individual welfare effects of the reform, measured for husbands and wives
separately within the collective model framework, are described by showing
the distribution of percentage changes in individual utility for every decile of
the pre-reform distribution of the wives’ or husbands’ equivalent disposable
income.20
A direct comparison of the welfare analysis based on the two models is
made on the basis of cross-tabulation of the positions of households (winner,
indifferent, loser) with the pairs of positions of the spouses, whereby a cut-off
±0.1% change has been adopted to define indifference.
The following figures show the unitary (Figure 6), and the collective pre-
dictions (Figure 7 and 8) for individual taxation. Table 35 provides a com-
parison between the two models. Figures 7 and 8 show that, in the collective
case, individual taxation is only advantageous for women in the higher equiv-
alent income deciles. Men show some large gains and losses at all income
levels. The unitary model shows a balanced distribution of losers and win-
ners, and some very large losses and gains, especially at high income levels.
Surprisingly the welfare gain from individual taxation increases in average
with equivalent income.
Table 35 indicates that 36% of the couples lose, as well as 29% of the
19The equivalence scale for the household disposable income is: 1 for the first parent,
0.7 for the second, 0.6 for each child more than 16 years old, 0.5 for each child between 7
and 15 years and 0.4 for each child younger than 6 years, see equation (7).
20The equivalence scale for the individual disposable income is 1 for the parent (the wife
or the husband) and the same as above for the children. It corresponds to variable heq in
equation (7).
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Figure 6: Relative welfare gains for households
women, but that for men, the proportion of losers is higher, and attains
57%. The percentage of Pareto winning households (i.e. combinations ++,
+0, 0+) is only 18%; there are 27% Pareto losers (- -, -0, 0-), and 22%
contradictory entries (h+,-0), (h+,0-), (h+,- -), (h+,00), (h0,++) etc.. The
percentage of households for which the move to individual taxation generates
conflicting effects for husband and wife is as high as 39%. Other results, not
illustrated here, show that the collective model predicts richer women without
children to fare better under individual taxation, whereas the unitary model
suggests that couples without children are disadvantaged by the reform.
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Figure 7: Relative welfare gains for married women
w
el
fa
re
 g
ai
n
deciles of equivalent baseline husbands disposable income
-2.77117
4.87728
 pUm_ind
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Figure 8: Relative welfare gains for married men
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Table 35: Winners and losers: collective vs.unitary model, individual taxa-
tion
f− f− f− f0 f0 f0 f+ f+ f+
m− m0 m+ m− m0 m+ m− m0 m+ total
hous− 11.71 3.08 3.38 2.10 3.38 .45 10.89 1.05 36.04
hous0 3.75 .68 1.28 .68 5.86 .15 6.01 1.28 19.67
hous+ 3.60 1.05 .45 .90 5.41 .38 17.42 14.79 .30 44.29
total 19.07 4.80 5.11 3.68 14.64 .98 34.31 17.12 .30 1332
total f (f−) 28.98 (f0) 19.29 (f+) 51.73 1332
total m (m−) 57.06 (m0) 36.56 (m+) 6.38 1332
Notes: move from the 1998 joint system to individual taxation. Rows correspond to
winning (hous+), indifferent (hous0) and losing (hous−) couples, on the basis of the
estimated coefficients of the unitary model. Households are considered indifferent
if their post-reform utility level is the same ± 0.1% as before the reform. Columns
correspond to the winning, indifferent or losing wives and husbands on the basis
of the simulated “collective” data. Spouses are considered indifferent if their post-
reform utility level reform is the same ± 0.1% as before the reform.
8 Conclusion
The aim of this study was to illustrate the distortions arising in policy eval-
uation on the basis of a unitary model when the real world, in fact, follows
collective rationality. We have tackled this question by simulating real world
microdata within a collective set up and by estimating a unitary model on
these data. A comparison of the collective data and the unitary estimation
results showed that in the baseline situation, on average, labour supply is
under-predicted by the unitary model. In total, only a third of female labour
supply decisions are correctly predicted as well as 40% of the male.
In terms of policy evaluation the distortions entailed by the use of the
wrong model may be even more interesting. A first distortion shows up in
the design of the tax reform. While a revenue neutral move from joint to
individual taxation, realised by proportional scaling of tax liabilities, leads to
a factor of .942 with the collective model, the unitary model leads to a much
lower factor of .894. The predictions concerning changes in the distribution
of the tax burden on couples and singles, while going in the same direction
of a shift from singles to couples, are of starkly different magnitudes.
As regards changes in labour supplies, the unitary predictions do well
for less than half of the wives. Overall, in the collective setting, wives’
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labour supply is more responsive to the reform, whereas using the unitary
model, more men are predicted to alter their labour supply. That is, when
basing policy evaluations on estimations from the unitary model while living
in a collective world, we underestimate the change in hours for wives and
overestimate the change for husbands.
As for the normative aspects of the reform, we have looked at changes in
household utility (unitary model) and changes in individual utility (collective
model). In a comparison of the predictions of both set-ups, 22% of the
conclusions at the household level turn out to be contradictory. That is,
both spouses are predicted to be affected in one way by the collective model,
and household is predicted to be affected in the opposite way by the unitary
model.
Finally, an aspect which is totally ignored by the unitary model turns out
to be quantitatively important. The collective model reveals that the reform
has conflicting effects for 39% of the households: that is, a welfare gain is
predicted for the wife and a loss for the husband or vice versa. Note that these
within-household implications of a policy measure can only be uncovered by
using a collective model of household behaviour where husband and wife are
considered as distinct decision makers with individual preferences.
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9 Appendix A: Estimation results: wage equa-
tions and predictions for couples
Table A1: Wage equations for couples
wives husbands
coef. std.err. t-value coef. std.err. t-value
East -.21 .08 -2.61 -.27 .12 -2.3
a40 .79 3.52 .23 .38 .06 6.5
a402 -.32 1.58 -.20
a40_East -.15 .11 -1.4
sch_real .07 .10 .75 .10 .02 4.7
sch_abi .22 .11 1.88 .22 .03 6.8
job_noap -.32 .08 -3.97 -.06 .04 -1.6
job_fach .07 .07 .93 .03 .02 1.6
job_uni .50 .11 4.69 .28 .04 7.8
child0 .13 .24 .53
child3 -.16 .21 -.74
child7 -.07 .07 -1.02
child16 -.02 .05 -.47
constant 1.96 1.94 1.01
(uncensored) obs. 809 1113
adj. R-squared 0.416
Notes: East : person lives in Eastern Germany. a40: age divided by 40. a402
square of a40. a40_East : interaction a40× East,sch_real, sch_abi, job_noap,
job_fach and job_uni: indicator variables for short secondary schooling, long
secondary schooling, no vocational degree, technical training, and polytechnic or
university degree, respectively. child0, child3, child7 and child16: number of
children in the household less than 3 years old, between 3 and 6 years, between 7
and 12 years and over 16 years, respectively.
Table A2: Wages for couples
no. mean s.d. min. 10% 50% 90% max.
wf 1332 11.66 4.48 1.81 7.17 11.09 16.07 74.32
wm 1332 15.57 6.16 4.46 9.22 14.61 23.65 59.45
Note: see note to Table 4.
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10 Appendix B: Concavity condition of the
unitary utility function
The utility function is:
U (c, lf , lm) = βc ln(c− c¯) + βf ln(lf − l¯f ) + βm ln(lm − l¯m)
+ δ ln(lf − l¯f) ln(lm − l¯m)
We assume that all the differences c− c¯, lf − l¯f , lm− l¯m are positive, as well
as the coefficients βc, βf and βm. Since the gradient of U is:
∂U =


βc
c− c¯
1
lf − l¯f
£
βf + δ ln
¡
lm − l¯m
¢¤
1
lm − l¯m
£
βm + δ ln
¡
lf − l¯f
¢¤


,
a sufficient condition for U to be increasing in its arguments is
δ > min
(
−
βf
ln
¡
lm − l¯m
¢ ,− βm
ln
¡
lf − l¯f
¢) . (18)
We assume that this condition is satisfied. The hessian of U is:
∂2U =


− βc
(c− c¯)2
0 0
0 −
βf + δ ln
¡
lm − l¯m
¢¡
lf − l¯f
¢2 δ¡lf − l¯f¢ ¡lm − l¯m¢
0
δ¡
lf − l¯f
¢ ¡
lm − l¯m
¢ −βm + δ ln ¡lf − l¯f¢¡
lm − l¯m
¢2


. (19)
Calling A the second diagonal block, concavity of U is then equivalent
with A negative, thus, given condition 18, with detA > 0. Thus the concavity
condition is £
βf + δ ln
¡
lm − l¯m
¢¤ £
βm + δ ln
¡
lf − l¯f
¢¤
> δ2. (20)
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